Mine Disasters Essays

Mine Disasters Essays Mine Disasters Essay Mine Disasters Essay Essay Topic: Notes From Underground Mining disaster in the past have been referred to mining accidents claiming five or more lives. Mine disasters once were really common. In the single year of 1907 there were 18 coal mine disasters.. Among the disasters in 1907 was historys worst the Monongah coal mine explosion, which claimed 362 lives and impelled Congress to create the Bureau of Mines. I will discuss this disaster more later in this paper. Mine accidents have declined dramatically in number and severity through years of research, technology, and preventive programs. Today mine accidents resulting in five or more deaths are no longer common. However preventing recurrence of disasters like those of the past remains a top priority requiring constant attention by management, labor, and government. Thus, it happened in 1907 when the Fairmont Coal Companys mine at Monongah, West Virginia exploded killing 362 men and boys. Congress reacted to the disaster at Monongah by passing and toughening mining laws. Through disasters such as this one and many others it has forced laws and regulations, technology,and training which has brought us into mining as we know it. In 1910, following a decade in which the number of coal mine fatalities exceeded 2,000 annually, Congress established the Bureau of Mines as a new agency in the Department of the Interior. The Bureau was charged with the responsibility to conduct research and to reduce accidents in the coal mining industry. In 1968 less than five miles from Monongah another explosion had happened and the fire which resulted after killed 78 men at the Consol No 9 mines at Farmington, West Virginia. The Farmington explosion resulted in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 a far reaching document that promised a new day for the men in an industry that had claimed more than 100,000 lives since 1900. Even before the Farmington mine had exploded in 1968, there were a push going on for a better mine safety law. The Johnson Administration introduced a measure in the fall of 1968 that would dramatically strengthen the governments enforcement tools. It went to Congress too late and didnt hold up. Then came the explosion at Farmington and there were new converts to the cause of mine safety. That is when the Nixon Administration expanded upon the Johnson Administration proposals of 1968 and addressed the potential for mine explosions in proposed legislation. President Nixon went on to sign the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 on December 30, 1969. Enforcement powers in coal mines increased greatly, at that time the Act required four annual inspections for each underground coal mine and two inspections for each surface mine. The Act for the first time established mandatory fines for all violations and criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations which was a big step in the right direction in my opinion. The act eliminated non gassy mines from special legal exemptions. All mines were considered gassy and additional inspections were required. The powers of the inspectors were expanded and the nspectors were given the power to close a mine for imminent danger. Miners were given the right to request a Federal inspection. Safety standards for all coal mines were strengthened under the 1969 Act and health standards were also adopted. The Act also provided benefits to miners disabled by black lung disease. The legacy of the Sunshine Mine disaster is reflect ed in greatly enhanced miner training programs and fire protection measures in metal and nonmetal mines across the country. In 1973 the (MESA) Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration was created out of the Bureau of Mines as the first Federal agency with the sole purpose of assuring miners of a safe, healthful working environment. Standards requiring mine emergency and self rescuer training, regular evacuation drills, and two mine rescue teams at underground metal and nonmetal operations were known by April of 1973. On March 9, 1977, the Agency was transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor and was renamed the better known Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The legislation which was signed by President Jimmy Carter, repealed the Federal Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety Act and amended the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 to combine protection of coal and metal and nonmetal miners under a single law, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (the Act). Following passage of the Act, additional required miner training, increased MSHA enforcement activities, and upgraded fire prevention standards continued to teach the hard learned lessons from fires at mines such as Cargill Salt Mine, Belle Isle, Louisiana and the Sunshine Mine at Kellogg, Idaho. The new Act of 1977 required at least four complete inspections of all coal and non coal underground mines and two f all surface mines each year. Among other important changes the new law provided for procedures to speed up the regulation making process and stronger ways force compliance with Federal health and safety standards. This included increased capability of dealing with the most dangerous mine hazards, increased emphasis on protection of miners healt h, greater involvement of miners or their representatives in processes affecting worker health and safety, and improved procedures for assessing and collecting civil penalties imposed for violating mine health or safety requirements. Mine accidents have declined greatly in both number and severity as a result of years of research, technology, education, and preventive programs. During my career mine accidents resulting in five or more deaths are no longer common. One thing remains the same preventing the recurrence of disasters like those of the past remains a top priority requiring constant attention by management, labor, and government. The Sago Mine disaster was a coal mine explosion that had occurred on January 2, 2006, the Sago Mine was located in West Virginia. The explosion had trapped 13 men for nearly two ays with only one miner surviving. It was the worst mining disaster in the West Virginia since the 1968 Farmington Mine disaster that killed 78 people. The previous year the mine had been cited by the MSHA 208 times for violating regulations, and had a history of roof falls. Violations had included failure to follow the approved roof control and mine ventilation plans and problems concerning emergency e scape ways and required pre-shift safety examinations. The explosion occurred at approximately 6:30 a. m. at the beginning of the first shift after the mine reopened after New years holiday weekend. An examination conducted at 5:50 am by a mine fire boss had cleared the mine for use. Two man buses of miners were making their way into the mine to begin work. Early reports noted that there was a thunderstorm in the area at the time and suggested a lightening strike near the mine entrance may have ignited methane but no one reported seeing such a strike. Sensors from the U. S. National Lightning Detection Network indicated at least two lightning strikes near the mine. Another early theory was that lightning struck a methane well that had previously been drilled from the surface to an area behind the seals. Methane wells are used to extract methane from coal seams and sometimes from sealed areas when methane levels are high. Fourteen men on the second man bus escaped the initial explosion. The 12 trapped miners were on the first man bus which apparently passed the point where the explosion occurred. The foreman on the second trip whose brother was among those trapped the mine superintendent and three others entered the mine to rescue the trapped miners. They into the mine until gas detectors indicated there was too much carbon monoxide to continue. Although they were false reports of he 12 miners found alive there were only 1 Randal Mcloy jr. Randal McCloy Jr. wrote a letter to the families of the victims. McCloy wrote that three weeks before the explosion he and Junior Toler while drilling a bolt hole a gas pocket which detectors confirmed the presence of methane. He said they immediately shut down the roof bolter and the incident was reported up the line to our superiors. He stated he noticed the following day that the gas leak had been plugged with glue normally used to secure the bolts. On the day of the explosion just after exiting the man trip the mine filled quickly with umes and thick smoke and that breathing conditions were nearly unbearable and that at least four of the emergency oxygen packs were not functioning. He shared his rescuer with Jerry Groves, while Toler, Jesse Jones and Tom Anderson sought help from others. He said they were not enough rescuers to go around. Because of the bad air they had to abandon their escape attempt and return to the coal rib where we hung a curtain to try to protect ourselves. The curtain created an enclosed area of about 35 feet. They attempted to signal their location to the surface by beating on the mine bolts and plates. That effort caused them to breathe much harder and use more oxygen. After becoming exhausted they stopped trying to signal. The air behind the curtain grew worse so he tried to lie as low as possible and take shallow breaths he said he could tell that it was gassy. According to McCloy, Toler and Anderson tried to find a way out. The heavy smoke and fumes caused them to quickly return. There was just so much gas. At that point the miners began to accept their fate. Toler led them all in the Sinners prayer. They prayed a little longer then someone suggested that they each write letters to their loved ones. He said he became very dizzy and lightheaded and that some drifted off into what appeared to be a deep sleep and one person sitting near him collapsed and fell off his bucket not moving. It was clear that there was nothing he could do to help him. The last person he remember speaking to was Jackie Weaver who reassured him that if it were their time to go then God’s will would be fulfilled. As my trapped coworkers lost consciousness one by one the room grew still and he continued to sit and wait unable to do much else. He have no idea how much time went by before he also passed out from the gas and smoke, awaiting escue. There we many investigation which came up with possible theorys as followed:Lightning strike and seismic activity, Use of foam rather than concrete seals, Proximity with active gas and oil wells, Sparks from restarting machinery after holiday. After the disaster there were many provision that would, mandate equipment to communicate with miners, locate miners, a nd provide sufficient caches of air, Rescue teams must be staffed and on site, Operators must notify the MSHA immediately when there is an accident, Any coal operator who fails to do so will be ubject to a $100,000 fine and/or 12 to 15 years imprisonment, The bill would mandate a rapid notification and response system, The bill would create a new mandatory minimum penalty of $10,000 for coal operators that show negligence or reckless disregard for the safety standards of the Mine Act,The bill would nullify an MSHA rule issued in 2004 that authorizes the use of belt entries for ventilation, which may have caused fire in another accident at Alma, The bill would create a science and technology transfer office in MSHA to pull research and development ideas rom other federal agencies for use in the mines,The bill would create an ombudsman in the Labor Department’s Inspector General office for miners to report safety violations. Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) A ct after the Sago and Darby Mine explosions in 2005 and 2006 I have read many notes left to the families of the miners trapped in disaster not only this one and we keep one posted on our mine rescue station door to remind us why we are doing what we do he is the letter: Ellen, darling, goodbye for us both. Elbert said the Lord has saved him. Do the best you can with the children. We are all praying for air to support us, but it is getting so bad without any air. Horace, Elbert said for you to wear his shoes and clothing. It is now 1/2 past 1:00. Powell Harmon’s watch is in Andy Woods’ hand. Ellen, I want you to live right and come to heaven. Little Elbert said he trusted in the Lord. The bad air is closing in on us fast. Dear Ellen, I leave you in bad condition, but set your trust in the Lord to help you raise my little children. Elbert said for you all to meet him in heaven, for all of the children to meet us both. Raise the children the best you can. Oh how I wish to be with you. Goodbye, all of you, Goodbye. Bury me and Elbert in the same grave by little Eddie. Goodbye Ellen, Goodbye Lillie, Goodbye Jimmie, Goodbye Minnie, Goodbye Horace. Oh God, for one more breath. Ellen, remember me as long as you live. Goodbye darling. It is 25 minutes after 2:00. There are few of us alive yet. Jake and Elbert. The Aracoma Mine accident had happened when a conveyor belt in the Aracoma Mine No. 1 at Logan WV caught fire. The conveyor belt ignited on the morning of January 19, 2006, pouring smoke through the gaps in the Stopping line and into the intake that the miners were supposed to se for their escape, obscuring their vision and ultimately leading to the death of two of them. If the stoppings had been in place they would have prevented any smoke from the conveyor belt to the intake the primary source of air for workers inside the mine. Instead investigators now believe, smoke flooded into the air intake, which also serves as an escape route, disorienting two of the min ers, who became lost and died in the fire. The two men, Ellery Hatfield, 47 and Don Bragg, 33, died of carbon monoxide poisoning when they became separated from 10 other members of their crew. The others held hands and edged through the air intake amid dense smoke. As the federal agency that conducts research to advance mine safety and personal protective technologies, moves the results of research to workplace practice, and tests and certifies respirators for workplace use, NIOSH is working with diverse partners to plan, support, and carry out research that addresses those needs. Areas of focus include:Innovative designs for SCSRs that will provide air to users for longer durations. NIOSH is interested in new technologies for training that simulates actual respirator use. Realistic training that can be done frequently and efficiently will improve miners’ ability to escape. Changes in requirements for evaluating and testing SCSRs . Collaboration with the Mine Safety and Health Administration to update current training modules for donning SCSRs. Updates will incorporate guidance on the donning of multiple SCSRs during an emergency escape, reflecting new requirements under the MINER Act of 2006. Those provisions require mine operators to provide individual miners with immediate access to at least two SCSRs, and to store extra units along escape ways. Aracoma brought about more of training and provision to strengthen their ability to inspect better and enforce laws and regulations in place such as:better tools for cracking down on companies with patterns of violations, stronger protections for whistle blowers, stiffer criminal penalties and quick fix injunctive relief that would let the Department of Labor act decisively against an operator when it identifies an immediate threat The Upper Big Branch Mine disaster occurred on April 5, 2010 underground at Massey Energys Upper Big Branch mine at in Raleigh County, West Virginia. Twenty nine out of thirty one miners at the site were killed. The explosion occurred at 3:27 pm. The accident was the worst in the U. S. since 1970. High methane levels were detected and subsequently an explosion from an unknown source occurred. Twenty five men were initially killed. Four days later the four missing men were found dead for a total of 29 deaths. While investigations is still ongoing, officials have speculated that it may have been caused by a spark from a mantrip. Due to the large area and concentration of toxic gases mine rescue teams were able to enter and kept getting ulled out delaying rescue and recovery efforts until holes were drilled for ventilation. They were many problems in the past with violations as with many mine who have had disasters miners were scared some even left notes before the explosion and due to the size of the explosion there had to be large amounts of dust as well as methane of course Massey is denying their responsibility they have already prosecuted some officials I would write more on this disaster that we all have heard many reports and are familiar with this disaster but I do not wish to speculate ore until the investigations are complete and I am stating facts instead of opinions I would not like to speculate on something that has effected so many lives of my fellow miners and their families. Although they have not really been any changes in laws and since the Upper Big Branch explosion other than the non-combustible material has raised to 80% or better in returns instead of 60%. Since the April 2010 explosion the safety agency has also ramped up enforcement created new mine safety screening procedures and conducting 228 impact inspections at mines with poor safety records or other warning signs of problems. The agencys new screening procedures were put in place after officials discovered that a computer error had allowed Upper Big Branch to evade heightened scrutiny. The agency has also proposed new safety rules that would result in speedier enforcement for mines that have shown a pattern of serious violations. The Monongah Mine disaster of Monongah, West Virginia occurred on December 6, 1907 and is labeled as the worst mining disaster in American History. The explosion was said to be caused by the ignition of methane which ignited the coal dust in mines number 6 and 8, killing hundreds of workers. Rescue workers could only work in the mines for 15 minutes due to the lack of breathing equipment. Some of those workers also perished due to suffocation caused by methane oxidation. The lives of 362 or more workers including children were lost in the underground explosion, leaving 250 widows and more than 1000 children fatherless. The exact death toll remains unknown. The worst of the explosion occurred in the No. 8 mine and so great was its force that the concrete roof of the engine house was torn into fragments and one piece weighing more than 100 pounds was blown more than 500 yards. The victims came to their deaths suddenly. Many were found sitting upright in the positions they were in when the explosion came with its spread of deadly gases. The scenes at the mines during the work of rescue were pitiful in the extreme. For several days frantic women grouped about the opening of the mines and their shrieks of agony were enough to move the hardest heart to pity. Grief stricken mothers, wives, sweethearts and sisters waited and watched and cried and prayed. Although the village of Monongah was unprepared for the disaster relief work was quick nd effective. Relief parties were rapidly formed and additional forces were hurried from Fairmont and adjacent cities and towns. But with a few exceptions there was no need for the physician and the rescuer -death to those in the mines came fully and suddenly and without suffering. The mine officials as well as the officials of the B. O. Railroad Company took an active part in the relief and many acts of bravery were performe d by the volunteers who entered the mines in search of the victims. Appeal for funds with which to carry on the relief work mong the families of those who perished met with a quick response. The sole survivor of the blast was Peter Urban. He found a small foxhole to climb out before the toxic gases reached him. Some believe that several other men escaped with him but there is little evidence to validate that. Although they are some difference in these explosions they are similarities between them. Most of them the true cause may never be known. Many of them had also been repeat offenders of violations. From all mining disasters they have been new laws or regulations with stiffer compliance, improved training and technology. If you couldnt tell from the Upper Big Branch you can see that when a disaster happens in the mines West Virginia supports each other all miners are familys and close and we support each other. Although the mining industry remains dangerous we have took great strides for improved safety and will continue to pursue that goal, not only have we made great strides in the mining but also in Mine Rescue from training and equipment improvements and hopefully many more will come in to be better prepared to save the lives of fellow miners if such a disaster was to happen again.